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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper is concerned with a reactivation of the dimension of the political in 
political economy. The question of politicisation is explored in connection with recent 
theoretical reflection on postmarxism and the systems theory of Luhmann. A main 
contention is that, in contrast to naturalistic perspectives, there is no pre-given object 
of political economy. Rather the objectivation of the economy has to be considered in 
strictly hegemonic terms; terms that, I argue, are the condition of possibility for a 
politicisation of political economy. On these grounds, the paper advances an 
alternative approach to political economy that may be considered radical insofar as it 
does not attempt to conceal the fundamental dimension of the political. This approach 
will be further developed in the context of contemporary themes and debates 
surrounding the question of globalisation and the potential openings for hegemonic 
intervention by the left. Here again the status of the political is taken to be paramount. 
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The question of political economy has taken on a particular centrality since the rise of 
modernity. As the figure of God progressively receded, the thinkers of the 
Enlightenment began to put their faith in the analytic discovery of founding principles 
for the construction of a rational social order that would in turn secure the conditions 
for secular emancipation. Such principles became the essential focus for an emerging 
‘natural science’ of political economy. If the medieval period was dominated by a 
theological project of interpreting God’s laws, the success of the new age was seen 
largely in terms of working with what were perceived as the underlying laws of 
economic reality. In this way, the economy was idealised as an object of first 
principles, of a priori foundation, around which it was rationally and morally 
incumbent to construct society. 
 
 2 
Through an analysis of what it saw as the logical and objective mechanisms of the 
economy, classical political economy aspired to intellectual mastery over the real. At 
the same time, the ‘objectivity’ of the economy was constructed in radically different 
ways. Liberal political economy, for example, stressed the fundamental importance of 
the so-called free market. In terms of Smith’s famous conception, it is only through 
the unencumbered movements of an ‘invisible hand’ that the conditions for social 
equilibrium can be established. This naturalistic approach to the market was seen to 
reflect certain basic (metaphysical) ‘laws of justice’ that could be applied universally.1 
For Smith political economy constituted ‘a branch of the science of the statesman or 
legislator’ in which the essential principles of governance could be rationally 
determined. In a similar vein, Mill defined political economy as ‘the science which 
traces the laws of such of the phenomena of society as arise from the combined 
operations of mankind for the production of wealth…’ (1948: 140). 
  
Marxist political economy, by contrast, focused on the domain of production as the 
ultimate reality. History was conceived as possessing a structure that contoured the 
dynamic and contradictory playing out of the tensions between the forces and 
relations of production. In this regard, Marx’s central objective was to ‘lay bare the 
economic law of motion of modern society’ (Preface to Capital). Such a law 
determined that communism would be the final outcome of history: a unique and final 
epoch capable of resolving all basic antagonisms through collective ownership. 
 
While the liberal and Marxist versions of political economy construct the objectivity 
of the economy in characteristic ways, and are totally different in their prescriptions, 
they share nevertheless the same type of problematic. In both cases, the economy is 
derived as a metaphysical, or idealist, construct whose laws remain constant in every 
social formation. The economy exists as a conceptual model that can be pre-specified 
as an underlying structure of rationality on which to base the social order. Thus the 
potential for emancipation and moral progress is seen to depend on a particular 
economic model: liberalism – the free market; Marxism – the socialisation of the 
means of production. And in this regard, both types of political economy tend to be 
presented, by their respective advocates, as ultimate rational accomplishments; as 
embodying characteristic ends of history.2 
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Using Husserlian terminology, we might say that a crucial task for our purposes is to 
reactivate what has become sedimented, or forgotten, in the notion of political 
economy. Through routine use, this notion has become progressively sedimented 
within a tradition in which it has been made synonymous with generalised ideas about 
objective interests and positivistic truth – thereby concealing the traces of its own 
philosophico-discursive origins.3  It is something of a paradox that political economy 
(in all its variants) has tended to eradicate the very dimension of the political. The 
ambition of political economy has been to master all ambiguity and contingency by 
establishing a final metaphysical ground – a set of immutable economic laws – that 
would enable social transparency. In this sense, traditional political economy has 
aimed at an Immaculate Conception, a theology of reason, that cannot be politicised 
or put into question. 
 
How then should we conceive the dimension of the political? This paper takes as its 
point of departure the argument of Lefort (1989). In traditional theory – and in 
particular positivist sociology – politics has been generally understood as one sub-
system among others (legal, cultural, economic and so on). In addition, politics has 
tended to be conceived as a secondary phenomenon: in the case of Marxism, as a 
superstructure that reflects the underlying movements of civil society; in the case of 
liberalism, as the institutional domain of public power that functions (or should 
function) on behalf of private interests. For Lefort such approaches conceal a far more 
radical dimension of politics, or what he calls the political (le politique): 
 ‘The political is thus revealed, not in what we call political activity, but in the 
double movement whereby the mode of institution of society appears and is obscured. 
It appears in the sense that the process whereby society is ordered and unified across 
its divisions becomes visible. It is obscured in the sense that the locus of politics (the 
locus in which parties compete and in which a general agency of power takes shape 
and is reproduced) becomes defined as particular, while the principle which generates 
the overall configuration is concealed.’ (Lefort, 1989: 11). 
 
The political, therefore, is that which shows the contingent nature of all structuring 
principles. In consequence, the political is not merely one system among others but 
fundamentally the constitutive dimension of every system up to, and including, the 
social framework itself. To make the same point in different terms: all systems are 
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ultimately ‘arbitrary’ (i.e. historical rather than ontological) insofar as they originate 
from an essential condition of undecidability. Far from realising a pre-existing 
positivist order, the positivisation of a system only takes place in relation to an 
irreducible negativity: that is, through the repression of alternative positivisations. 
This means that systems are both necessary and impossible: necessary for the purpose 
of conjuring some kind of order on the terrain of undecidability; impossible in the 
sense that the latter can never be fully mastered. 
 
Three points are especially worth making here. The first is that, by definition, the 
political cannot be represented as it has no particular location or agency. Nonetheless 
the effects of the political are continuously revealed in numerous dislocatory events – 
from armed conflict and social antagonisms right through to divorce and the 
breakdown of personal relations – in which certain structuring principles (ways of 
being etc.) are called into question. This is why Rancière speaks of the political as that 
which breaks with any received configuration and as ‘whatever shifts a body from the 
place assigned to it or changes a place’s destination’ (1999: 30). For Laclau and 
Mouffe (2001), on the other hand, the political designates the ontological dimension 
of impossibility that prevents Society from coming into being as a full positivity. And 
in this respect the political may be said to be quasi-transcendental in character.4 
 
Second, the relationship between the political and the social is not static but dynamic 
and historical. A particular society will be more or less ‘social’ in orientation to the 
extent that its basic generative principles are accepted as legitimate and are thereby 
able to establish a certain stability. By contrast, a politicisation of society occurs 
where such principles are thrown into question/doubt and lose their governing status: 
for example, the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the East 
European regimes. In such a politicised situation there exists a widening of the 
domain of the possible in which alternative hegemonic movements will seek to give 
new direction and consistency to society: in short, to establish a new societal effect 
apropos of new generative principles. The relationship between the social and the 
political, therefore, is tendential rather than positional.  
 
In this connection two further clauses should be noted. The first is that politicisation 
itself is radically contingent and cannot be referred to an exterior or infrastructural 
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logic that would predetermine the points of political eruption (e.g. economic crisis). 
The political is essentially indeterminate and may in principle be extended to all fields 
of the social. Second, the effects of the political cannot be predicted in advance (there 
is no telos or aufhebung that govern its movement). The effects of the political, and 
the resolutions thereof, will depend entirely on the historical struggle of concrete 
actors. 
 
Finally, given that all systems are ultimately undecidable then the question of the 
relationship between the ‘foundation’ of a system and what is ‘actual’ becomes 
incoherent. It is not a question of absolutist foundations versus the absolute lack of 
foundations. The point is that all foundations are constituted through logics of 
exclusion and repression.5 What is foundational about foundations is not ontological 
determination but hegemonic practice. In the sense of Foucault, and the later 
postmarxists, power and antagonism are constitutive of all being and are therefore 
ineradicable - the idea of a system achieving consistency without frontiers of 
exclusion/repression is clearly non sequitur. The dream of a rationalist-integrationist 
ideal (the holistic System) – discernible in Plato’s Republic of Reason, Marx’s final 
epoch and more recently in Habermas’ world of undistorted communication 
(Habermas, 1995), Rorty’s liberal utopia (Rorty, 1989) and Fukuyama’s end of 
history (Fukuyama, 1992) – is one that is based finally on a disavowal of the political 
and the impossible attempt to master its effects. 
 
In order to develop a radical political economy perspective, three interrelated 
arguments will be advanced. First, a political economy is one that, in contrast to 
traditional approaches, presupposes the essential discursivity of the economy. The 
reason for this is clear. The idea of an extra-discursive (i.e. a transcendental positivity) 
is something that is wholly incompatible with that of the political: the one eliminates 
the other. A radical political economy, therefore, is one that begins from the premise 
that the economy is essentially prone to subversion and reconstruction in respect of 
other hegemonic-discursive positions. 
 
Second, a radical political economy is not one that aims at establishing the ultimate, 
or true, model of the economy (e.g. anarcho-capitalism, mixed economy, social 
ownership and so forth) on which to base the social order but precisely the opposite: 
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that is, the critique of the very idea of a model that could fulfil such a role. Put simply, 
it inscribes the dimension of impossibility as a positive feature of its approach. 
 
In this way – and this is the third argument – a radical political economy is one that is 
capable of sustaining what Derrida (1994) would call the promise of more just and 
democratic forms of economic practice that are always ‘to come’. It is through the 
affirmation of the logic of the political that the historical conditions of possibility (but 
only possibility) are created for an ongoing project of economic democratisation; a 
project that is based on hegemonic will rather than naturalistic foundations. A radical 
political economy is one that constantly heeds the call for further radicalisation 
beyond any telos or optimum. 
 
It is in these terms that the paper seeks a reactivation of the dimension of the political 
and to show its consequences for the analysis of political economy. The paper first 
examines the way in which the problem of the political has been dealt with in modern 
political economy and especially the Marxist tradition. It then moves to a 
consideration of the way in which Luhmann’s systems perspective may be profitably 
combined with postmarxism with a view to developing an alternative approach to 
political economy.  
 
This of course begs the question as to what is meant is by postmarxism? At a general 
level, postmarxism is understood as an emerging philosophico-intellectual movement 
characterised by the steady erosion of the logic of necessity that we find in orthodox 
Marxism. This movement is most notably associated with ‘postmodernists’ like 
Foucault, Lyotard and Derrida, among others, but is also reflected in such thinkers as 
Gramsci, Hilferding and paradoxically Marx himself (see below). 
 
More specifically, postmarxism is identified with the thought of Laclau and Mouffe 
who, drawing on this movement, have developed (and are developing) a compelling 
perspective that synthesises postmodern and Marxist themes. This perspective turns 
ultimately on two principal assertions. First, all objects are given to us as objects of 
discourse (2001: 107), and this applies not only to the world of language but also to 
the extra-linguistic or material world; the latter is co-extensive with the discursive. 
Consequently it is impossible to climb out of the discursive realm or to reach a point 
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of final transparency. The idea of an access to an incontestable and substantivist 
‘extra-discursive’ is precisely the dream of all idealists. 
 
The second assertion is that ‘antagonism is the limit of all objectivity’ (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 2001: 125; and Laclau, 1990: 17). This means that what we call ‘objectivity’ 
is something that always has to be carved out as a field of intelligibility through logics 
of exclusion and antagonism. Objectivity is always a hegemonic-power construction 
that, by definition, involves the repression of alternative constructions through 
(historical) frontiers of antagonism. And by acting as a limit, antagonism is 
constitutive of all objectivity. This argument is of capital importance for the 
proceeding analysis of systems theory.6  
 
Finally, the paper addresses the implications of an alternative postmarxist/systems 
approach in the context of the recent themes and debates surrounding the question of 
globalisation. In particular, it focuses on the possibilities for hegemonic intervention 
by the left. What ultimately is at stake here, it will be argued, is the type of orientation 
that exists towards the political. 
 
 
The Persistence of the Political 
 
The history of Marxist thought reveals a progressive undermining of the idea of the 
economy as an autonomous entity with endogenous laws. With the likes of Hilferding 
and Gramsci, and certainly the later postmarxists, what begins to emerge is a new type 
of perspective in which the political itself becomes increasingly apparent as an object 
of theoretical reflection. To this effect, the economy has been shown to depend on 
more and more conditions of possibility that, far from expressing any cosmic decree, 
are themselves the result of contingent political practices. Yet the tension between 
naturalism and the logic of the political is already revealed within Marx’s own 
thought. 
 
One of the great achievements of Marx consists in what Hesse (1980) might call his 
metaphoric re-description of the economy; a re-description that, for the first time, 
sought to analyse economic relations in terms of social context. Marx was vehemently 
opposed to those conventions of political economy that attempted to derive economic 
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meaning, and to justify vast inequalities of wealth, on the grounds of a mythical state 
of origins. 7 
  
In contrast to abstract ideals, Marx affirmed the social character of labour (see esp. 
Capital vol. 1) such that the individual’s potential for production and self-
development is always dependent upon a given framework, or mode of production, 
that in turn reflects certain power relations; a balance of forces between classes. This 
enabled Marx to advance a powerful critique against naturalistic conceptions of 
capitalism that have persisted from Smith and Locke right through to Friedman and 
the dominant forms of neo-classical economics. Against such pieties concerning ‘free’ 
labour contracts in an open market, Marx demonstrated how workers are forced to sell 
their labour power as, under capitalism, they are denied access to the means of 
production and subsistence. For Marx, the classical liberal paradigm turned precisely 
on the attempt to finesse the power basis of capitalism. 
  
In this regard, we may argue that a logic of contingency is already apparent within 
Marx insofar as there is a fundamental emphasis on the economy as a human 
construction rather than an underlying form waiting to be discovered. By de-
objectifying the economy and showing its reality to be the result of wider power 
relations that generates its principles of construction, there is a clear sense in which 
Marx expanded the dimension of the political. At the same time, this expansion is 
limited as, in a contrary movement, there is a re-absorption of the political within a 
new form of objectivism. As a true child of the Enlightenment, what Marx aims at is 
not positivity itself but rather the liberal version of it. In this way, he attempts to 
restore the modernist enterprise through the affirmation of a metaphysics of history 
subject to essential laws that foretell of an ultimate resolution.  
 
The political shone all too briefly in Marx. Yet it was not something that could be 
entirely extinguished. Indeed the subsequent history of the Marxist imagination is 
characterised by a tendential ebbing and flowing between the idealist search for 
certainties and their persistent denial by the political. This is reflected in an increasing 
de-stabilisation of the traditional economic/non-economic distinction. Rejecting the 
view of the economy as a self-enclosed order Hilferding, for example, focused on the 
way that the modern economy developed within the terms of a nationalist framework.8 
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Gramsci, of course, developed this line of enquiry even further. For Gramsci, the 
economy cannot be separated from ideological and cultural practices but is articulated 
with these phenomena in a characteristic historic bloc. By developing a radically 
contextualist approach, Gramsci showed that nothing automatically follows from 
economic relations and that we cannot predict whether they will be articulated in 
nationalist, liberal or social democratic terms (or other terms). A basic undecidability 
exists whose resolution will depend upon the outcome of concrete forces in political 
struggle.  And the types of resolution will have crucial consequences for the 
construction and functioning of the economic space. 
 
In his emphasis on the non-natural (undecidable) character of structuring principles, 
Gramsci may be said to render visible the political as a basic dimension of all social 
ordering and identification. We might reasonably argue that Gramsci is distinguished 
in modern thought not so much as a political theorist but as a theorist of the political. 
In his critique of economism, Gramsci provides the theoretical resources for 
politicising political economy and thereby for a new imagination of actively 
radicalising economic practice. 
 
Yet it would be mistaken to think that theoretical reflection on the political has 
developed only within Marxism. One could cite examples of various thinkers, from 
other traditions, whose interventions have also served to undermine objectivist-
naturalist approaches to the economy: Weber’s analysis of economic development in 
terms of religious-cultural context; Simmel’s argument that the value of money cannot 
be referred to an absolute foundation but depends on a broader network of symbolic 
exchange; Polanyi’s emphasis on the social conditions of possibility for a ‘market 
economy’; Keynes’ demonstration of the artificial constitution and manipulation of 
the economic ‘ground’ through state intervention. More recently, writers such as 
Aglietta (1979; 1998), Lipietz (1987; 1992) and Boyer (1990, 1997) have shown 
further that the regulation of the economy is not an endogenous matter (as in classical 
models). Economic stability depends on the construction of an entire mode of social 
regulation that transcends the economy as such. Each of these thinkers, in varying 
degrees, allude to the fact that the economy cannot be regarded as a closed 
autonomous order but has to be considered in contextual and discursive terms (see 
Daly, 1991, 1999a). 
 10 
 
The envisioning of the political, however partial or incomplete, is not exclusive to any 
one tradition, but reflects a synergy of all those themes and tendencies that have led to 
a weakening of idealist thinking about economic reality. Out of this synergy emerges 
the possibility of developing a radical approach to political economy that opposes the 
search for an ontological ground with the basic affirmation of the non-natural 
character of all economic order and identity. Such an approach would begin from an 
analysis of the ways in which all economic systems attempt to conceal their essential 
lack of ground through artificial power processes of discursive constitution. It is in 
this context that the work of Luhmann makes an important contribution. 
 
 
From Autonomy to Autopoiesis 
Beyond the Positivity of Systems 
 
Contemporary political economy has drawn increasingly on the influential work of 
Luhmann and, in particular, his notion of autopoiesis (e.g. Lash and Urry, 1994; 
Leyshon and Thrift, 1997; Jessop 1990, 2002). The general tendency has been to link 
autopoiesis with a certain endogeny in the development of complex systems of 
exchange and production. Jessop, for example, enlists autopoiesis to underscore his 
view that the economy (specifically, the capitalist market economy) exhibits a radical 
operational autonomy (Jessop, 1990, 2002). Notwithstanding this autonomy, Jessop 
maintains that a market economy is further sustained by interdependent forms of 
regulation and what he refers to as ‘social embeddedness’ within the lifeworld of a 
society (2002).  
 
There are two main problems with this perspective. First, Jessop tends to conflate the 
notions of autonomy and autopoiesis and in doing so, I would argue, loses sight of the 
distinctiveness of the latter. Second, and related, there is sometimes an inclination in 
Jessop to present the idea of economic autonomy in terms of a rather traditionalist 
economy/society division. The point that should be emphasised is not that economic 
practices cannot achieve a certain (relative) autonomy, but that this is entirely a matter 
of politico-discursive constitution in a particular context and is not something that can 
be universalised.9 The ambiguity surfaces at those points where Jessop insists on an 
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analysis that secures a basic distinction between the discursive and the extra-
discursive (1990: 302; 1999: 2). This clearly runs the risk of reproducing a standard 
formulation whereby the economy is implicitly identified with the ‘extra-discursive’ 
dimensions of material reproduction, structural conditions and so on (as if the latter 
were independent of discursive reality and stood outside history). There is thus the 
potential danger that ‘social embeddedness’ could be perceived as a simple process of 
adjustment to, and the legitimisation of, an underlying autonomous economic reality.  
 
Luhmann’s perspective allows for a different approach. Through his theory of 
autopoiesis, Luhmann’s central innovation concerns his problematisation of autonomy 
conceived as extra-discursive foundationalism. At the same time, Luhmann’s position 
is highly ambiguous. If, on the one hand, Luhmann demonstrates the non-grounded 
character of all systems, on the other, he is drawn towards a new type of idealism in 
which society is presented as a positivity of systems that progressively masters all 
distortion. I will argue, in contrast, that the radicalism of Luhmann’s autopoietic 
theory can only be realised fully by linking it with the postmarxist affirmation of the 
ineradicability of power, negativity and antagonism: that is, by linking it to the notion 
of the political and a transcendence of all positivism. 
 
Luhmann begins from the position that ‘the world is constituted by the differentiation 
of meaning systems, by the difference between system and environment’ (1995: 208). 
On these grounds, Luhmann rejects the quest for substantive origins.10 What Luhmann 
affirms is that systems can never be grounded in anything solid. In summary, it is 
because of the essential absence of any (extra-discursive) ground that we have 
systems in the first place. If an ultimate ground was reachable then the logic of 
systematisation would cease to have any meaning: we would simply have infinite 
presence – a final domestication of the real. 
 
A system establishes its consistency by differentiating itself from its ‘environment’: 
i.e. that which designates the negative correlate of the system, or ‘simply “everything 
else”’ (ibid. 181). This is achieved through processes of self-referral or autopoiesis.11 
The crucial point is that there is no immaculate origin of the system. Rather a system 
is autopoietic insofar as it manifests the ‘recursive application of its own operations’ 
(Luhmann, 1988, p. 336). The coherence of a system depends upon its ability (over 
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time) to differentiate itself from, but also to engage with and interpret, its environment 
in terms of its code of organisation. 
 
The system of law, for example, no longer appears arbitrary because of numerous 
layers (sedimentations) of case study, constitutional interpretation, protocol, preceding 
judgements and so on; all of which help to reinforce coherence and patterning. At the 
same time, such layers serve to repress the fact that there exists no clear point of 
origin – autopoietic routinisation is precisely the illusion of foundation – and that the 
legal system cannot be based on any absolutist conception of Law.12 
 
A system of law requires, in the first place, a basic code for distinguishing what is 
lawful and what is not. But this immediately presents a paradox because the 
legal/illegal distinction is not something that can be determined outside the system of 
law. Furthermore, the question as to whether the legal system itself is legal or illegal is 
strictly unthinkable and undecidable (see Esposito, 1991). And this applies to the 
formation of every system. Where a system’s code encounters itself – as in the 
legality or illegality of an existing system of law – the system is confronted with a 
fundamental lack of ground: in short, it is confronted with the political. No system is 
capable of systematising its own principle(s) of construction. 
 
What autopoiesis shows is that the ‘ground’ of any system is merely the artifice of its 
recursivity. Every foundation is ultimately a phantom of a system’s tautological (self-
referring) constitution. This is why for Staheli the ‘self-referential system functions as 
a metaphor for the impossibility of the origin’ (Staheli, 1995: 19). No system can find 
an edge, and the more a system refers to itself the more it serves to underline an 
essential lack of foundation. Autopoiesis is precisely that which acts as a stand-in for 
the absent foundation. 
 
From this perspective, the idea of autopoiesis has to be strictly separated from 
traditionalist conceptions of autonomy and independence. It is precisely because the 
latter cannot be formed that autopoiesis comes into being. The ‘closure’ of any system 
is purely an artificial/historical effect that depends upon the discursive-contingent 
practices of inclusion/exclusion. On these grounds we can infer the basic paradox 
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governing all systematicity: that the lack of origins/foundations makes systems both 
necessary and impossible. 
 
This paradox, I would argue, is not sufficiently developed by Luhmann. He appears to 
be irresistibly drawn to an idealist position and his extensive analysis of differential 
system formation becomes simultaneously a major weakness. This is particularly 
apparent in his functionalist account of contradictions and conflict.13 For Luhmann, 
conflicts and contradictions ‘function as an alarm in society’s immune system’ (ibid. 
387): that is, as a kind of signalling in which ‘(t)he signal merely warns, merely flares 
up, is merely an event – and suggests action in response’ (ibid. 337). The problem 
here is that while he explicitly rejects such totalising notions as Centre and Subject, 
his alternative conception of social reality – as a perpetual differentiation of systems – 
runs the risk of becoming equally totalising.  
 
The development of systematisation is one that is regarded as capable of tendentially 
resolving social negativity and opacity. By conceiving society in terms of an immune 
system, he effectively reduces the notion of the political to one of simple adjustment 
(or ‘noise abatement’). Politics becomes a mere problem of perturbation that can be 
neutralised within the basic framework of the societal system and in such a way that 
autopoiesis proceeds undisturbed (ibid. 373). In the manner of all idealism, Luhmann 
entertains the idea of a progressive mastery of the political through the affirmation of 
a process of autopoietic adjustment that is ultimately interior to the societal system as 
a whole: i.e. a systematicity that is seen to generate its own conditions of possibility. 
In this way, social reality again appears as a positivistic closure – a self-contained 
universe of interdependent and infinitely reflexive systems – that, in the tradition of 
Hegel, holds the promise of an increasing incorporation and transparency. But this 
view of the political is not a necessary or exclusive consequence of autopoietic theory 
itself. The Luhmannian openings allow for a more radical approach that is capable of 
transcending all systemic positivism. 
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System Failure 
Reintroducing the Political 
 
The essential question that begs to be answered in Luhmann’s analysis is what are the 
conditions of possibility for system formation as such? In addition, how should the 
frontiers of a system be conceived? 
 
For Luhmann systems exist as a basic phenomenalism. As in a complex organism, 
systems develop through processes of differentiation that augment coherence and 
regularity – creating an ‘order from noise’ (ibid. 171) – and each system functions as 
difference within an overall process of differentiation (ibid. 208). By basing his 
analysis on a pure logic of differentiation (a logic that embodies systematicity as 
such), Luhmann advances a vision of the social universe in terms of a constant, and in 
principle limitless, expansion of systems.14 Little wonder that Luhmann is drawn 
towards a Hegelian progressivism as regards human destiny and the management of 
its affairs. 
 
From a postmarxist perspective this vision is defective. In the first place, the 
formation of systems depends fundamentally on the construction of frontiers of 
antagonism against an irreducible negativity. Systems can only be systems in relation 
to what they are not: as fields of intelligibility carved out against that which would 
overwhelm them. And it is because frontiers are always precarious in the face of such 
negativity that they may be said to establish the conditions of possibility and 
impossibility for all systems. 
 
Luhmann is correct in his observation that any attempt to represent what is beyond 
‘meaning-constituting’ systems is ultimately interior to those systems and merely 
leads to their extension: put in other terms, the significance of any ‘beyond’ always 
involves a system of signification. There are two points here. First, the problem of the 
necessity of limits for all being is not something that can be made to disappear. 
Second, such limits are unthinkable within the Luhmannian paradigm of a continuous 
logic of differentiation. A differential approach to limits is evidently self-defeating as 
it would mean transforming the latter into a difference within the system – thereby 
rendering ineffectual their function as limits.  
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The effectivity of a true limit derives from a strictly opposing register. A limit is only 
instituted as the result of the failure of a system and a radical interruption/suspension 
of its differential logic. The limit of a system emerges precisely at the point where a 
system cannot incorporate or represent a set of elements and in consequence excludes 
the latter as Other. Limits, therefore, are produced as orders of equivalence and not 
difference (see Laclau, 1996). Every limit depends upon a certain dichotomy between 
an equivalential order of those elements perceived as belonging to a system and a 
corresponding equivalential exclusion of those elements identified as a ‘threat’ to that 
system. In short, limits are always of the type system/anti-system.15 
 
This evidently does not mean that limits remain fixed in a once-and-for-all manner. 
Limits can always be subverted and displaced precisely because they are penetrated 
by negativity.16 In this sense limits are always historically defined. What is 
transhistorical, however, is the fact that limits per se cannot be eradicated. For 
example, a moral system that is designed to maximise tolerance in respect of cultural 
differences is one that is also compelled ‘violently’ to exclude its Other: racial 
bigotry, xenophobia, cultural chauvinism and so forth. The very possibility of a 
system of differential tolerance is one that depends on, and grows out of, the 
equivalential negation of that which is deemed to be intolerable. And as Laclau and 
Mouffe (2001) point out, exactly the same logic applies to the constitution of society. 
Societies, as historical phenomena, only come into being through equivalential 
frontiers that establish the senses of belonging/non-belonging: a ‘them’ in order for an 
‘us’. In consequence Society – conceived as a total integrative system – is radically 
impossible. 
 
Three points should be emphasised. First, a system can only be instituted through 
logics of exclusion and antagonism that in providing the sense of limits are 
constitutive and affirming of its positive content (a ‘not-system’ in order for a 
‘system’). Accordingly every system is a power construction that relies upon the 
repression of its Other. This insight is decisive in turning foundationalism on its head. 
Systems do not possess positive grounds but are shown to grow out of negativity and 
antagonism. It is not that systems are foundation-less, but rather that ‘foundations’ 
exist as historical frontiers of antagonism that derive from a basic order of negativity. 
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This means – second point - that the political can be seen to be a fundamental 
dimension of every system. In the absence of pre-existing grounds or generative 
principles, all systems are ultimately political to the extent that they are constituted 
through acts of violence and exclusion. A legal system, for example, cannot be 
legalised in an external or absolutist sense, but depends upon discursive fiat and 
contexts of social power: ‘these commandments and not those’. This is precisely what 
Derrida means when he speaks of the ‘violence of the law before the law’ (1994: 31): 
that is, a political intervention that sustains the possibility of a legal system only to the 
extent that it shows its impossibility as a natural positivity.  
 
Every system is marked by an originary discursive violence, an arbitrary ‘line in the 
sand’, that seeks to establish a certain territorial coherence vis-à-vis radical 
undecidability. Through processes of routinisation and sedimentation, systems 
typically attempt to finesse their artificiality by concealing the political nature of their 
origins behind a particular idealism. In search of authenticity, the violence of a system 
tends to be disavowed through reference to an external and tautological principle – 
destiny, divinity, dynasty (‘the way it is/always has been’) – and, more especially, 
through the invocation of certain mysterious laws of history, nature, the market, God 
and so forth. We might say that what is missing is the psychoanalytic insight into the 
obscene supplement (of violence and repression) that necessarily accompanies every 
system and upon which the latter implicitly relies.17 This gives rise to an irresolvable 
tension. On the one hand, autopoietic mechanisms seek to gentrify systems through 
artificially inducing closure and by presenting them as natural and universal. On the 
other hand, the repressed-excessive dimension, which is constitutive of a system, is 
something that can never be mastered and thus all ‘closure’ and ‘universality’ is 
inherently compromised. It is in this tension between systems and their ungovernable 
excesses that the political is continuously re-born. 
 
In consequence, and as a final point, systems are essentially prone to failure and can 
always be challenged and subverted by precisely those forces that are 
antagonised/excluded by a system. An important corollary of this is that failure cannot 
be reduced to an internal moment of autopoietic readjustment. Rather failure 
designates the eruption of those events and antagonisms that are external to the 
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system in the sense that they cannot be managed or represented within the terms of the 
latter.18  Moreover, there exists a fundamental gap between the failure of a system and 
the processes of recomposition; a gap through which the ontological possibility of the 
political emerges. Whether a failure will be resolved through fascist, socialist, social 
democratic or some other means, is not something that can be derived from the failure 
in and of itself: this will depend on the outcome of a hegemonic struggle in a 
particular context. Failure is not merely a transition in the unfolding of a pre-given 
principle of intelligibility but rather the very degeneration of the latter. 
 
System failure is one that leads to a widening of the realm of the possible19 – a 
reactivation of the political – in which a diversity of social forces (in a historical 
context) will compete to establish new principles of ordering and intelligibility that 
will in turn affect the dimensioning of systems and the nature of their autopoietic 
functioning.20  What postmarxism enables us to grasp is the susceptibility of 
autopoiesis itself to hegemonic re-formulations; re-formulations that are essentially 
possible because of the central impossibility of mastering failure and negativity.  
 
Crucial to this perspective is an implicit distinction between two (tendentially) 
different orders of negativity. On the one hand, failure is to be understood as strictly 
inherent to, and constitutive of, systems as such. In this sense failure functions as a 
transcendental apriori. On the other hand, we can also speak of the extent to which 
failure is sedimented, or becomes (re-)activated, in a particular historical context. 
Feminism provides a good example. 
 
From Wollestonecraft onwards, feminists have been able to successfully exploit the 
inherent limitations of Enlightenment discourse that in principle calls for rights for all 
but which in practice has tended to exclude women from its ‘universalism’. In our 
terms, we would say that feminists (to greater and lesser extents) have been able to 
hegemonically challenge, and provoke the failure of, the sex-gender assignment 
system of patriarchal societies. However, the very fact that this has been possible at 
all is because the sex-gender assignment system is intrinsically dislocated and cannot 
fully determine/domesticate female subjectivity (or, for that matter, male 
subjectivity). The historico-contingent development of feminist subversion is enabled 
precisely because of a transcendental failure/dislocation that is generic to all systems. 
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The point is that the relative stability or instability of any kind of social system is not 
something that can be determined, in advance, but will depend on the types of 
(in)active political engagement that exist in a given conjuncture.21  But what is 
entirely transhistorical and de-contextual, and what allows for eternal politicisation(s), 
is the fact that all systems can be in principle subverted. 
 
It is this process of positively (re-)activating failure that we are surely witnessing 
today in the mobilisations against global liberal capitalism and its evident failures to 
embody universalism. 
 
 
Natural Capitalism? 
Globalisation(s) and the Political 
 
Luhmann’s perspective may be said to reflect a particular tension in contemporary 
thought between what might be called the epistemological and aspirational 
dimensions of modernity. The modernist paradigm can be understood as a series of 
rationalist attempts to subordinate the political within an overall system of integration 
where basic antagonisms have been eliminated. In the contemporary era, there has 
been a clear distancing from such rationalism and its totalitarian propensities. At the 
same time, writers like Bell (2000), Fukuyama (1992) and Rorty (1989) – who would 
endorse this distancing – nevertheless affirm the tendential emergence of a new 
holistic order: global liberal capitalism.22 In this way, a certain embodiment of the 
modernist aspiration – an ultimate systematisation – is presented as having somehow 
survived the epistemological ruination of modernism as such. From this point of view, 
liberal capitalism and human destiny are seen to comprise a synchronicity that is 
being historically realised. 
 
According to this type of perspective we live in a post-political age in which the 
overwhelming emphasis is (or should be) on pragmatism. This is evidenced in a 
variety of current discourses: the widespread manifestations of Third Wayism and the 
idea of a general synthesis of left and right positions; Habermas’ ‘deliberative 
democracy’ where antagonisms would be supplanted by transparent reasoned debate 
in a communicative ideal; right through to Beck’s ‘New Enlightenment’ where 
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politics is conceived largely in terms of a technocratic enterprise engaged in resolving 
the common problems of risk and reflexive modernisation.23 Each of these 
perspectives, to varying degrees, may be said to reflect a certain Luhmannian faith in 
the construction of a fully matured system that is reconciled to itself and which is 
capable of functioning on behalf of all humanity. 
 
More recently, this tendency is reflected in the fashionable, and increasingly 
influential, thesis of ‘natural capitalism’ developed by Hawken et al. For these authors 
natural capitalism is concerned with the creation of a new industrial revolution that 
accords with planetary eco-systems and responds to the ‘basic principles that govern 
the earth’ (1999: 313). Accordingly a holistic system of evaluation is envisaged: 
 ‘To make people better off requires no new theories, and needs only common 
sense. It is based on the simple proposition that all capital be valued. While there may 
be no “right” way to value a forest, a river, or a child, the wrong way is to give it no 
value at all.’ (ibid. 321) 
 
All natural capital (i.e. basic resources, eco-system function and so on) has to be taken 
into account through the creation of ‘a financial system where all value is placed on 
the balance sheet, and where nothing is marginalised or externalised because social or 
biological values don’t “fit” into accepted accounting procedures’ (ibid. 319). Thus 
social and environmental problems may be resolved by factoring in the latter to the 
economic calculus of capitalism. A new order of capitalism is conceived - one of 
genuine global transparency - in which the human and non-human worlds may be 
harmonised through a universal algorithm of value.24  
 
Hawken’s et al perspective, of course, is a further reflection of the modernist fantasy 
of a totally integrated system: capitalism as the embodiment of an ultimate paradigm 
(if only tendentially) that is based on essential ecological laws and whose legitimacy 
is unassailable. This relies on the strict disavowal of capitalism as a contingent power 
construction that is riven with antagonisms. More than mere epithet, the term natural 
capitalism appears as an attempt to naturalise capitalism as such. But let us look at the 
matter more closely. 
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The basic thesis is that natural capitalism is already evolving as a pragmatic synthesis 
of different approaches and strategies (liberal, socialist, ecological, etc.) in response to 
the exigencies of planetary socio-environmental problems. In Luhmannian terms, 
what these authors are assuming is the ability of capitalism to autopoietically adjust to 
new situations and to incorporate new interests and demands through an expansion 
and maturing of its systemic logic(s).  
 
The immediate question arises as to whether natural capitalism (or any construction) 
is capable of continuously expanding and of incorporating more and more demands of 
a divergent nature without actually turning into something else? The answer can only 
be negative. Using the authors’ own argument, the very fact that capitalism can be 
constructed in a socialist direction (e.g. Scandinavian welfarism) or a liberal one (e.g. 
American free-marketeering) means that it is essentially prone to subversion and 
hegemonic re-constitution. It is not a question, therefore, of the simple extension of 
the existing principles of capitalism, but rather a fundamental disruption and 
distortion of the latter through confrontation with alternative (and even opposing) 
principles of constitution. Against the Hegelian-inspired ideal of a limitless horizon of 
natural capitalism – in which socialism, ecologism and so on would appear as mere 
differences devoid of equivalential/systemic challenge – we should re-affirm the 
inhesion of antagonistic frontiers. The construction and particular shape of a capitalist 
order will always depend on hegemonic struggle between concrete forces in a given 
context. 
 
There exists no necessary point of convergence between, for example, socialism, 
ecologism and capitalism. In reality, the achievement of the type of articulation that 
Hawken et al have in mind could have no other basis than the de-naturalisation of 
capitalism. A socialist-ecologist-capitalism would be neither a devoted totality nor the 
result of simple autopoietic evolution. The point is rather to recognise how the 
different elements – socialism, ecologism, capitalism – could be put together, in an 
undecidable manner, as a political construction with new relations of power and 
exclusion. 
 
The construction of an ecological-capitalism (with high levels of regulation regarding 
industrial practices, growth, energy, etc.) is one that would clearly depend on the 
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ability to hegemonically repress the liberal form of capitalism and its autopoietic 
logics. More than this, if the relations between these different elements is purely 
contingent and hegemonic in character then, in contrast to Hawken et al, the unifying 
principle of economic practices need not be capitalist at all. Economic discourse could 
be articulated far more strongly with not only the principles of socialism and 
ecologism but also an expansivist democracy in which the pursuit of profit would be 
increasingly marginalised as an archaic barbarism. Beyond infrastructuralist views, an 
intrinsic potential exists for developing the economic order in terms of a widening 
emancipatory imagination that would be capable of sustaining the promise of an 
ongoing radicalisation of economic practices beyond any idealism or systemic fixity.  
 
For similar reasons, the idea of an objectivist audit of value must also be rejected. The 
assignment of value (like meaning) is neither a neutral nor absolutist matter. What, for 
example, is the value of equality as against liberty? This is no mere abstraction but 
comes down to concrete questions concerning the relative priorities ascribed to social 
health provision, welfare services, levels of taxation, the scope for individual choice 
and so on. At the level of the international market, how should economic stability and 
the provision of cheap commodities in the West be evaluated against high levels of 
poverty and exploitation in regions such as Indonesia? As U.S. and Western military 
forces are mobilised in Iraq, how should the cost of socio-economic exclusion from 
the New World Order be calculated? 
 
There exists no positive ground for value. Valuation is something that grows out of 
devaluation, and the constitutive frontier between the two will depend entirely on 
historico-discursive context. Like all systems, a system of evaluation is one that 
depends on exclusionary frontiers. This insight is, to some extent, already present in 
Marx. What Marx alluded to was precisely that which, in the sense of Lyotard (1993), 
is exorbitant in capitalism: that which is beyond the system of valuations as such, but 
which nevertheless renders such a system possible (Lyotard, 1993: 145). This 
exorbitancy, of course, is located at the level of human labour power and its creative 
energies.  
 
At the heart of the seemingly neutral calculus, and evaluations, of capital lodges a 
fundamental incalculability: the exorbitant cost in respect of human potential and 
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social justice. Perhaps the most striking feature of this incalculability is the so-called 
foreign debt. This debt is now so extreme, so permanent, that it cannot properly be 
evaluated within existing conventions. The quantification of this debt appears 
increasingly arbitrary and absurd. In the modern age, the foreign debt - a debt which, 
in practical terms, is beyond calculation and is exorbitant in relation to any possibility 
of actually being met - is rather the name (or one of the names) for the structural 
dislocation, the traumatic failure, of global capitalism as a universalist system.  
 
While capital works ceaselessly to transform and commodify all existing social 
relations, what it refuses to bargain with (in fact, cannot bargain with) is precisely its 
exploitative conditions of possibility. Within the strict terms of the capitalist paradigm 
– conceived as a set of institutional practices and arrangements based on the pursuit of 
(relative levels of) profit – what cannot be evaluated is its own symptom of global 
privation and injustice. What Marx identifies is the obscene calculous (i.e. the social 
power structures) behind the universalist pretensions of modern economic calculus.25 
This is why Marx insisted that capital was both radically cosmopolitan and intensely 
parochial: in order to create a global system, capital seeks to conceal the politico-
discursive violence of its construction through the autopoiesis, or gentrification, of 
that system.26 It is against this background that central themes in the development of 
globalisation may be addressed.27 Here again the question of the political is one of 
paramount importance. 
 
From a liberal perspective, globalisation is largely presented in terms of the 
inexorable expansion of anonymous market relations that is precipitating a new order 
of transparency and pragmatic integration. In this context, transnational corporations 
tend to be viewed as embodying an extraterritorial sovereignty whose authenticity is 
sustained by an oracular network of international stockmarkets interacting through 
cyber-space: an abstract centre-less empire naturalised, in a strange Habermasian 
twist, as communicative rationality. The invisible hand is transmuted into a pure 
digitalisation that functions as an essential backdrop to all social reality. This is 
precisely what Žižek means when he refers to capital as the Real of our age (1999: 
276).28 It also resonates with Hardt and Negri’s conceptualisation of the liberal 
capitalist version of Empire as ‘an order that effectively suspends history and thereby 
fixes the existing state of affairs for eternity (2000: XIV). The strength of Empire lies 
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not so much with conquest and domination (although, of course, it is predicated on 
violence) as with its capacity to adapt and to differentially absorb widening interests 
and demands in such a way that real systemic-equivalential challenge becomes almost 
unthinkable. Empire functions as a postmodern totalitarianism, a tyranny of 
differences, that establishes the very co-ordinates within which opposition and dissent 
themselves take place. Beyond Beck and Giddens, it is this reflexivity – i.e. the 
capacity of Empire to take into account, and thereby manage, its own failures and 
oppositions – that constitutes the defining political reality of the postmodern age.  
 
This new naturalism is one that construes economic management as a simple matter of 
neutral calculus: as Tony Blair puts it, there is ‘no left or right in economic policy, 
only good and bad’ (1998). Globalisation becomes a master signifier routinely 
invoked in the justification of an ongoing retreat from pro-active socio-economic 
intervention. Inverting Nietzsche, we might say that there exists a will to 
powerlessness in obeisance to a logic of economic necessity. Globalisation is 
perceived as the realisation of a predestined order: an autopoietic enlargement and 
maturation of a capitalist system capable of continuous adjustment in its de facto 
universalism. The defensive posture taken towards political critique in this perspective 
is one that is also reflected in the secretive nature of Summit Meetings and the 
establishing of a kind of Olympian detachment by conducting the latter in 
geographically remote areas, beyond the reach of popular-democratic forces. 
 
At the same time, there are clear opposing tendencies in which the disclosure of the 
political is becoming increasingly manifest in terms of a widening set of antagonisms 
that persistently erodes any sense of global objectivity or transparency. An obvious 
example is that of Europe. Based on economistic principles, the initial calculation was 
that through economic integration and the elimination of trade obstacles, political 
stability and integration would automatically follow. Today, however, we see very 
much the revenge of the political in the ongoing constructions of the meanings and 
identities of Europe. In the context of the European Union, what current developments 
are tending to reveal is that there is anything but a ‘common market’; much less one 
that would serve as a unifying structure for the different elements of this region. The 
very attempts to stabilise European markets has led to an increasing emphasis on the 
themes of conscious control that, in Derridean terms, function as a ‘dangerous 
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supplement’ to the former. European economic decisions increasingly have to take 
account of – and, as such, are modified by – a whole range of concerns: 
environmental, social, cultural, regional… Similarly, new European institutions and 
legislation reflect a multiplication of political struggles around issues of social justice, 
poverty, discrimination, the determination of rights and so on.  
 
These struggles are progressively de-naturalising the idea of a self-regulating market. 
Far from expressing an autonomous logic, the construction of the ‘market’ – and, 
more generally, the economic space – now has to begin from far more sites of 
antagonism and hegemonic reconstitution than ever before. To this effect, the 
contemporary era is one that is marked by a constant displacement of any ‘centre’. 
Thus what is haunting Europe is not the spectre of a fully-fledged socio-economic 
project but, on the contrary, the very lack of a stable representation for Europe. 
 
Similarly, extensive mobilisations throughout the Western metropolises, against the 
anti-democratic practices of the WTO and the G7 agencies, continue to bear witness 
to the failure of any ‘New World Order’. Not only do such mobilisations serve to de-
gentrify the ordering principles of liberal capitalism, they also expose the relations of 
power and constitutive violence on which the latter is based – and not least reflected 
in some of the highly repressive measures taken against protesters.29 Far from 
expressing a naturalistic movement, globalisation is revealed as a process of 
combined and uneven development with multiple points of rupture and challenge, and 
multiple forms of representation that elude ontological mastery. It is a process that is 
essentially prone to dislocation, failure and all those forces of the political that 
constantly undermine capitalism’s autopoietic pretensions to universalist autonomy. 
In short, globalisation is both a power construct and a power struggle. 
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Radical(ly) Political Economy 
 
These developments signal a heightening of the moment of the political in the 
contemporary world. It is in the context of this heightening that a radical (or radically) 
political economy may be formulated and which, through a combination of 
postmarxism and systems theory, may be turned to democratic advantage. 
 
Radical political economy is distinguished from traditional political economy in a 
number of ways. In the first place, it rejects the idea of the economy as an 
autonomous realm governed by metaphysical laws and, consequently, the idea that it 
could function as a founding order. In concurrence with Luhmann, the economy is 
understood as a (discursive) system, like any other, in which consistency and 
durability are the result of the historical forms of internal coherence and the 
autopoietic articulation of its elements. At the same time, radical political economy 
endorses the postmarxist argument concerning the constitutive and precarious nature 
of frontiers of antagonism. This clearly goes beyond Luhmann. Whereas Luhmann 
tends to view autopoietic mechanisms as capable of resolving the political, 
postmarxism affirms the eternal nature of the latter such that all systems, and their 
autopoietic logics, are essentially prone to hegemonic disruption and re-constitution. 
Neither system failure nor its forms of recomposition can be decided in advance but 
depend entirely on hegemonic struggle. 
 
This perspective creates the opportunity for the left to develop a far more progressive 
and democratic approach to socio-economic practice than is possible with traditional 
political economy discourse. Such an opportunity rests upon two movements that are 
ultimately in contradiction and which reflect what I have referred to as the necessity 
and impossibility of the system.  
 
The first movement consists of the attempt to realise an emancipatory project, to 
deliver the amplitude of the social system, through concrete measures that would be 
consonant with a widening democratic culture. This requires the development of what 
might be called a contextualist politics of engagement by the left: that is, a politics 
that works with the logics of globalisation (rather than simply reacting to them in the 
defence of national-cultural autonomy and so on), precisely in order to subvert and 
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radicalise them. Against writers like Jameson (2000) who tend to reaffirm traditional 
leftism through a negative and binaristic reading of contemporary struggle (either 
U.S.-led globalisation or Gaullist-type nationalist resistance – Jameson, 2000: 65-66) 
we should rather accept the challenge of Hardt and Negri who argue that the left must 
abandon the image of an infallible vantage point from which to advance a pure 
unsullied politics (2000: 46). As they point out, new openings and forms of resistance 
are made possible today precisely as a result of Empire. This is certainly evidenced in 
the evolution of regulatory networks at a transnational level (and the attempts to 
broaden and democratise these), and the increasing mobilisation of non-governmental 
organisations from around the world who continue to join forces – chiefly through the 
internet – in order to oppose corporate domination of global agendas.30  
 
It is within the terms of these contrapuntal tendencies that the left can find new 
hegemonic leverage. Although a fully developed socio-economic programme is 
beyond the scope of this paper, some initial measures could be developed in order to 
galvanise a contextualist politics and to promote an alternative vision of globalisation. 
Beyond the conventions of neo-liberalism and profit-maximisation, such a vision 
would establish the principle of maximising equality and liberty for all as a basic 
socio-economic priority. Important measures would include inter alia: 
(a) A far stronger connection with the language of freedom that the neo-liberals speak 
so fervently, but in a way that subverts it in the direction of universal equality. 
This involves securing the argument, recently reinforced by Sen (1999), that 
freedom is not simply a question of individual liberty but is crucially a matter of 
social commitment. Thus the freedoms that are celebrated in postmodern 
consumer capitalism can only have meaning if societies are prepared to resource 
their members in such ways that they can participate in those freedoms. In short, it 
means demanding more real freedom beyond the limited neo-liberal view of 
freedom. 
(b) A movement away from welfarism/workfarism to a system of basic income 
(Groot, 2000; Hardt and Negri, 2000; Parijs, 1992) that would guarantee a fuller 
participation in the so-called stake-holding society, without the ritualised 
humiliations of current unemployment practices. This involves a different type of 
articulation. In contrast to the minimalist, and increasingly authoritarian, social 
democratic approaches to equality, the latter would be subverted in the direction 
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of freedom. This means recognising that freedom and participation have a ‘value’ 
that needs to be accounted for. It involves denaturalising the connection between 
our societies and the capitalist system and recognising that it is this system that is 
failing people and not the other way round. 
(c) An emphasis on the systematicity of capitalism as a power construction and a 
rejection of the disabling conception of the latter as the ultimate horizon of reality; 
a conception that underpins retreatist attitudes and sees only the nation-state as a 
(weak) site of resistance. This involves the development of a pro-active politics of 
globalisation that, beyond the simple expansion of market forces, links it with 
progressive demands for universal rights of freedom and equality.31 These rights 
would be further enshrined in international agencies – e.g. a World Rights 
Organisation with similar powers to those of the W.T.O. It would amount to 
demanding greater levels of globalisation in the direction of democratic 
universalism. 
(d) A normative endorsement of the need for high levels of progressive taxation as 
the very condition of social freedom (i.e. not as a necessary evil but as a political 
good). Beyond the existing conventions of general taxation, there should be a 
particular emphasis on the taxing of transnational corporations who, within the 
current global framework, typically avoid the payment of huge amounts of tax and 
in some cases end up paying negative tax (http://www.corpwatch.org).32 Here again 
the stress would be on a politics of taxation and of generating new principles for 
organising the latter. In this connection, the creation of new categories of energy 
and resource-use taxes should be a clear priority in the age of global risks. The 
revenue raised could be used not only to expand and democratise our welfare 
systems but also to provide grants and funding for co-operatives and non-profit 
organisations on an international scale (especially in the economically subjugated 
regions of the world). This would help to create new economies of real diversity 
as opposed to economies of managing demand through monopolistic forces. And 
here the left must also render visible the shaded protectionism and monopoly-
orientated subsidisation (especially in the U.S.) with a view to establishing fair 
terms of trade for all. Again, this means using precisely the arguments of neo-
liberalism against actually existing neo-liberalism. 
(e) An affirmation of the freedom to pluralise, expand and participate in the spaces 
and fora for affecting economic decisions. This requires the development of a 
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politics not simply through existing spaces (parliaments, senates, assemblies etc.) 
but a politics of space; of multiplying and democratising the spaces of 
representation. It cannot be a question of rejecting, or retreating from, the sites of 
global representation – the Council of Ministers, Summit Meetings and so on – 
but rather one of radicalising and reconfiguring them in respect of democratic 
effectivity: i.e. extending the principles of regulation and subjecting international 
markets to political will. This, and all of the above, depends upon a political 
imagination that endeavours constantly to possibilise the impossible. 
 
These are by no means exhaustive, nor should they be understood as comprising a 
further model of the New Jerusalem. Rather they are intended to identify key areas in 
which a contextualist politics could subvert existing logics of globalisation in the 
development of a left hegemonic project based on radical democratic principles.33  
 
In a second movement, however, there is the recognition that, no matter what 
measures are taken, the holistic society is an illusive object and that the hour of total 
symmetry never arrives. Instead we are confronted eternally with the partial and 
provisional power processes of social constitution and de-constitution, in which the 
frontiers of the social remain just that: frontiers, and not geometric edges. Thus while 
it is certainly possible to hegemonically repress and exclude particular discursive 
systems – e.g. the liberal construction of market relations, the devotion to profit and 
so on – this can only take place insofar as power and repression per se cannot be 
eradicated. This, above all, is what establishes the radical dimension of radical 
political economy and which distinguishes it fundamentally from all traditional forms 
of political economy. For the left this means the endorsement of a paradoxical 
endeavour: that is, the development of a contextualist politics of hegemonic 
engagement that simultaneously affirms the de-contextual nature of the political. It is 
precisely in sustaining the tensions between the contextual and de-contextual levels 
that the left can renew its vigour and creativity.34 
 
Far from negating democracy, such a perspective supports the very conditions that 
would allow it to flourish. In opposition to all myths of naturalism, radical political 
economy would resonate with all those forces of challenge and indictment upon 
which the vitality of democratic life finally depends. The democratic articulation of 
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radical political economy could be characterised as a kind of faith in heresy and an 
affirmation of the capacity to betray what exists in the name of a justice and 
democracy that, in the Derridean sense, is always promised. 
 
On these grounds, an alternative relationship between political economy and the 
ethical is envisaged. In contrast to conventional discourse, the ethical imagination 
would not be orientated towards establishing the ultimate economic foundations for 
the good society or the pristine moral order, but precisely the opposite: the 
apprehension that such an undertaking is neither possible nor desirable.35 This would 
become the cornerstone of a new type of perspective premised on an awareness of the 
systematicity of all systems. Paradoxically, it would rely on what might be called an 
institutionalisation of lack (i.e. a basic affirmation that the ultimate emancipatory 
system is an illusion), and on maintaining the locus of failure as an essential fulcrum 
for effecting progressive socio-economic transformation. Tempered by an ethics of 
impossibility, such a perspective would not aspire to idealist façades but would seek 
instead to draw its strength from the persistence of the political. 
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Notes 
 
1.   ‘Every man has perfect freedom, so long as he doesn’t violate the laws of justice, 
to pursue his own interest in his own way and to set his enterprise as well as his 
capital in competition with the enterprises and capitals of other men.’ (Smith, 
1776, Book IV, Chapter IX). 
 
2.  In this sense, traditional political economy may be regarded as essentially 
ideological in terms of its basic fantasy of a rationalist objectivity. See Daly 
(1999b; 1999c) for extended discussions on the role of fantasy in ideology. See 
also Amin and Palan (2001) for a critique of rationalist approaches to political 
economy. 
 
3. Those studies of the type ‘The Political Economy of X, Y, Z…’ invariably tend to 
translate as ‘The Truth about/Underlying Reality of X, Y, Z…’. In this sense, 
political economy reflects the scientific aspirations of the Enlightenment. R. 
Albritton, for example, speaks of political economy as the ‘science of capitalism’ 
(1999: 151). 
 
4. Quasi-transcendental in the sense of Gasché (1986). That is to say, a 
transcendentalism that is emptied of all positive content. 
 
5. The founding of a post-apartheid culture, for example, is not the result of a 
biological revelation (the discovery of an epistemic human truth etc.) but is one 
that takes place through continued political mobilisation against the principles of 
apartheid. 
 
6. It is important to stress that postmarxism does not refer to a simple abandonment 
or rejection of Marxism. Rather it implies the development of certain themes and 
categories within Marxism in such a way that it allows us to transcend its 
metaphysical limitations. Thus postmarxism endorse the fundamental insight of 
Marx that capitalist society is constituted around a basic antagonism but it 
develops this considerably in terms of two crucial affirmations: (i) antagonism 
cannot be resolved in an absolutists sense (not even under communism) – while 
particular antagonisms may be eliminated (e.g. between Catholics and 
Protestants), antagonism as such cannot; (ii) antagonism is constitutive of all 
social relations and systems. 
 
7.  ‘Do not let us go back to a fictitious primordial condition as the political economist 
does, when he tries to explain. Such a primordial condition explains nothing’ (in 
Tucker, 1978: 71) 
 
8.  The radical character of Hilferding’s interventions also extends to his view of 
political subjectivity. In a remarkable passage that discusses the plight of Britain, 
he writes: 
 ‘Class antagonisms have disappeared and been transcended in the service of the 
collectivity. The common action of the nation, united by a common goal of 
national greatness, has taken the place of class struggle, so dangerous and fruitless 
for the possessing classes’ (Hilferding, 1985: 336). 
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    Within the construction of organised capitalism, therefore, class antagonisms 
actually disappear in the construction of a generalised nationalist identity that 
unites both workers and the bourgeoisie. The implications of this are unmistakable. 
Political subjectivity is not simply given by the position occupied at the level of the 
relations of production, but constitutively depends on an entire politico-ideological 
context that transcends those relations. The analysis moves away from a priori 
determinism and places a new emphasis on the contingency of identity and the 
historicity of socio-economic development. In this respect, Hilferding is clearly 
alive to the effects of the political. 
 
9. For example, economic practices will tend to achieve more autonomy from racist-
cultural discourses under conditions of social democracy than those of apartheid. 
 
10. As Luhmann puts it: 
‘This (the systems perspective) abandons, but does not simply dismiss, the 
traditional constitution of the world around a “centre” or a “subject”. The 
centre is replaced by the pivot of difference, or, more precisely, of 
system/environment differences that are differentiated in the world and that 
thereby constitute the world’ (Luhmann, 1995: 208). 
In this regard, we could argue that Luhmann’s notion of system comes close to 
what Derrida and Laclau and Mouffe would call a discursive formation. 
 
11. Literally meaning self-creation - from the Greek poiesis (creation). Autopoiesis 
first achieved currency with the thought of Maturana and Varela (Maturana and 
Varela, 1980, 1987; Varela, 1979), where it was applied to the field of biology. In 
this context, autopoiesis refers to a cybernetic description of cell metabolism 
whereby a cell establishes its coherence and consistency (its ‘inside’) through the 
mutual interaction and reinforcement of its components against its ‘outside’. 
 
12. This insight, of course, is not exclusive to Luhmann. Burke and Hume, for      
example, dispensed with the idea of a Ground for the law and spoke instead of the 
conventions of ‘prescription’ and ‘long usage’ respectively. More recently, Hart’s 
(1997) ‘rule of recognition’ (i.e. the recognition of authority as a first condition for 
the implementation of any law) and Kelsen’s ‘grundnorm’ (1997) may be said to 
perform similar functions. From another tradition, this perspective also chimes 
with Wittgenstein’s paradox concerning the application of a rule: that in order to 
apply a rule you first need a rule that tells you how to apply it, and so on and so 
forth, without ever arriving an ultimate originary rule. 
 
13. ‘One can clearly see how contradictions fulfil their function of warning and 
alarming. For an instant they destroy the system’s total pretension to being 
ordered, reduced complexity. For an instant, then, indeterminate complexity is 
restored and everything is possible. But at the same time contradictions possess 
enough form to guarantee the connectivity of communicative processing via 
meaning. The system’s reproduction is merely directed into different paths. Forms 
of meaning appear to be inconsistent, and this causes alarm. But the system’s 
autopoiesis is not interrupted. It goes on. The honour of being the first to have 
formulated this goes to Hegel’s conception of “dialectic”’ (Luhmann, 1995: 373 – 
original emphasis). 
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14.  On these grounds, Luhmann presents social reality as constituted within an 
ultimate horizon of systemic closure: 
 ‘Thus no meaning-constituting system can escape the meaningfulness of all its 
own processes. But meaning refers to further meaning. The circular closure of 
these references appears in its unity as the ultimate horizon of all meanings: as the 
world…Any attempt to go beyond it conceptually only extends it; any such attempt 
would have to enlist meaning and the world and thus would be what it was trying 
not to be.’ (Luhmann, 1995: 69). 
 
15. A religious system, for example, will incorporate a number of elements as 
differences within it: symbols, rituals, truth claims, moral codes etc. However, as 
well acting as differences within the system, each of these elements has the 
capacity to represent the entirety of the system by entering into a relation of 
equivalence with all of the elements. In the case of Christianity, this is clearly 
indicated in the duality of the crucifix. On the one hand, the crucifix occupies a 
particular position in the Christian framework, but, on the other hand, it is capable 
of symbolising Christianity as such and of establishing a basic frontier of 
belonging. 
      At the same time, this frontier demarcates the excluded categories of a system 
in terms of an equivalential order of Other/threat (blasphemy, false Gods/prophets, 
the anti-Christ and so on) that is in turn constitutive and stabilising of systemic 
integrity. It is in this sense that the stability of a system may be said to depend 
finally upon a certain failure: that is, a failure to incorporate an equivalential order 
of negation (of ‘threat’) and the consequent emergence of a frontier of antagonism 
that ‘grounds’ the system as such. 
 
16. In the case of Christianity, this is clearly evidenced in developments concerning 
scriptural interpretation, attitudes towards sexual behaviour, the participation of 
women in the Church and so forth. 
 
17. For a brilliant elaboration of this thesis see Žižek (1994 – esp. Chapter 3). 
 
18.  For example, the popular mobilisations against the system of apartheid. The 
externality here clearly does not imply an ‘extra-discursive’ but rather a  
deformation of the existing system from a position of equivalential resistance to it. 
 
19. Cinema-goers will quickly recognise that the title of this section recalls the 
denouement to the Wachowski brothers’ film, The Matrix, in which Neo (Keannu 
Reeves) precipitates ‘system failure’. Reinforced by Neo’s address to the unknown 
listener that ‘I’m going to show you a world where anything is possible - where we go 
from there is a choice I leave to you’, we might say that a certain expression is given 
to the opening of possibilities that is alluded to in the notion of the political.  
 
 
20. One only has to think of the systematisation of social space itself under the    
      contrasting conditions  of apartheid and post-apartheid to appreciate this point. 
 
21. This clearly moves away from the Leninist conception of the political in which 
hegemonic activity was understood as something that takes place subsequent to the 
breakdown(s) of the capitalist system (i.e. fluctuations and crises generated within the 
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imperialist chain). Thus despite the emphasis on vanguardist mobilisation, historical 
opportunity and so on, Lenin’s view of politics and the political is ultimately a passive 
one – an effect, or symptom, of a more fundamental underlying movement. What is 
being asserted here is rather the opposite. That is to say, political activity – which is 
always possible because of an essential systemic dislocation (even though this maybe 
relatively stable in a particular conjuncture) – can always (re-)activate system failure 
and thereby give new shape and direction to future reality. Here we are confronted 
with a paradox: through hegemonic activity, failure can always be provoked and even 
‘overcome’ (e.g. the Leninist transcendence of the Tsarist paradigm), but only on 
condition that failure as such cannot be overcome. 
 
22. This is not to imply that Luhmann himself endorses global liberal capitalism 
specifically. The point is rather that there exists a similarity of problematic (the 
progressive overcoming of the political). 
 
23. This perspective is not only reflected in the thesis of ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992), 
but also in the notion of a ‘democracy without enemies’ (Beck, 1998). The idea of a 
democracy without enemies, or any political system without enemies, reflects what I 
would call the holistic fantasy. 
 
24. This transparency, moreover, is one that is perceived as serendipitously coinciding 
with American culture: 
 ‘The potential outcome of natural capitalism and sustainability also aligns 
almost perfectly with what American voters are saying: They want better schools, a 
better environment, safer communities, family-wage jobs, more economic security, 
stronger family support, lower taxes, more effective government, and more local 
control. In this we are like all people and they are like us’ (Hawken et al, 1999: 322). 
 
25.  Although, of course, the mistake of Marx was to think that a universalist calculus  
       was ultimately realisable in the determination of a final paradigm. 
 
26. This is exemplified in Scorcese’s Casino. In this film, Scorcese explores the dual-
edged nature of capitalism through his two main characters: Sam ‘Ace’ Rothstein 
(Robert de Niro) and Nicky Santoro (Joe Pesce). As in Marx’s notion of primitive 
accumulation, Nicky may be said to reflect the primitive, or foundational, violence 
of capitalism; a violence that is integral to the construction of a casino system in 
the deserts of Los Angeles and to sustaining a power base for its operation (‘pre-
legal’ reliance on corruption, money-laundering, extortion and so on). As time 
progresses, however, Nicky becomes an increasing liability as he constantly seeks 
to reinforce his position through crude acts of gangsterism. What Nicky fails to 
appreciate, and what the character of Ace is all too aware of, is that the power of 
the casino resides precisely in it being a self-reproducing (autopoietic) system. It 
naturalises its violence through its obscene calculations of ‘chance’ such that the 
house always, ultimately, wins. In this context, we might say that Nicky represents 
the monstrous face of capitalism; an ugly reminder of the casino system’s origins 
who must be disavowed and consigned to the periphery. And thus, on the orders 
of certain corporate interests (that remain abstract), he is taken to the desert to 
meet the gruesome fate of being buried alive. In a similar way, we could say that 
the contemporary system of capitalism endeavours to gentrify itself through a 
disavowal of the crude reality of exploitation/privation and by pushing its 
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necessary measures of violent repression to the internal and external peripheries. 
What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty and Fukuyama is that the 
gentrification of the so-called new world order – of global liberal capitalism – is 
one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon the 
disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s population. In this 
way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalise capitalism by presenting its 
outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and 
sound judgement in a neutral marketplace.  
 
27. For introductory texts on globalisation and its effects see, among others, Beck 
(2000), Scholte (2000), Albrow (1996) and Robertson (1992). 
 
28. This marks a certain twist on the standard conception of the Real. Žižek is not 
referring here to the Real of capital as simply a limit to the symbolic, but rather as a 
kind of symbolic real; as a de facto universal register that all contemporary 
manifestations of the symbolic are obliged to pass through and/or orientate themselves 
in relation to. Whether in terms of neo-liberal devotion or radical negation, capital 
occupies this fundamental space of the Thing: a basic nodal point in the symbolic 
universe (Žižek and Daly, forthcoming). An interesting representation of this can be 
found in Aranofsky’s underrated film, Pi. Here the central character, Max Cohen, is 
obsessed with the following problem: 
 ‘Re-state my assumptions: one, mathematics is the language of nature; two, 
everything around us can be represented and understood through numbers; three, if 
you graph the numbers of any system patterns emerge, therefore there are patterns 
everywhere in nature…So, what about the stock market?’ 
Through an analytic parallelism between the perpetual digital output of the 
stock markets and the irrational constant of pi, Cohen discerns the existence of a 
mysterious number (consisting of 216 digits). This number is regarded as a 
fundamental code, and it is in the subsequent struggle to possess and operationalise 
this code that the key protagonists attempt to find their own version of salvation: one 
in terms of solving a mystery that will bring an end to his drive and mental suffering; 
another in terms of revealing the name and nature of God; and yet another in terms of 
mastering the system of capital exchange and thereby realising untold wealth. The 
point is that each of these positions are constituted as basic orientations to the 
symbolic real of digitalised capital and its capacity to act as the answer to each of 
these pathological demands. 
 
29. A common perception of the protest movements is that they are highly 
differentiated, that they lack a coherent political identity and are therefore not credible 
as opposition. I think that this is premature. The point that bears repeating is that we 
should not confuse politics (or political identities) with the political as such. The 
political manifests itself through dislocations, negativity and antagonisms, and these 
are much in evidence in today’s international protests. Now the way that these 
antagonisms are articulated, and the consequent political identities that will arise from 
such articulation, is entirely a matter of practical hegemonic engagement. Political 
identity – or more especially identification –does not emerge naturalistically nor does 
it take shape as the spontaneous realisation (á la Rosa Luxemburg) of a predestined 
agency (i.e. the revolutionary working class). A good example is the anti-Tsarism that 
existed in Russia. What Lenin managed to do was to (re-)articulate a whole range of 
antagonisms with the Tsarist regime – antagonisms that did not spontaneously 
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converge around Bolshevism – and out of this to construct a popular-hegemonic 
movement that united very dissimilar elements. 
One final point: we do not tend to hear questions concerning the coherence of 
the ‘pro-global capitalism’ sectors. Is this not because it would hold up a mirror to 
real complexities showing that what we accept as ‘reality’ and ‘common-sense’ is in 
fact a highly nuanced and precarious hegemonic formation? 
 
30. A recent example of this is the creation of the World Social Forum established in 
2001 with a view to developing an anti-neo-liberal vision of globalisation 
(http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/). At its last conference over 12000 delegates 
attended with around 5000 registered NGOs. See also http://www.corpwatch.org/ for 
information on organisations who are committed to resisting to the logics of global 
capital and to the development of an alternative globalisation. 
 
31. I refer to rights of freedom and equality not as something that can be grounded in 
an Enlightenment-based model but rather in the sense of the ‘agonistic democracy’ 
perspective that has been developed principally by Mouffe (2000; 1993; 1992). The 
argument here is that freedom and equality can only be constituted through certain 
power structures. This means that the ‘universalism’ of such rights will always be a 
historical-provincial construct that, in turn, is based on logics of exclusion and 
antagonism. Political subjects can only enjoy freedom and equality insofar as they are 
prepared to accept the rules, or ‘grammar’, of democratic encounter (an encounter that 
by definition excludes alternative grammars and systems of rules). See also Daly 
(1994). 
 
32. Perhaps here we should begin to speak less about ‘foreign debt’ and far more 
about corporate debt. If the non-payment of corporate tax was to be backdated then 
this would certainly run into billions. 
 
33. A response to this approach might be to say that it amounts to simple reformism 
and that it is not so different from Third Way politics. I would reject both charges. 
This approach does not seek to eliminate antagonisms or to offer any kind of 
integrative synthesis of the different ideological positions. There are two basic aspects 
here. First there is the recognition that there will be winners and losers (we are never 
in a win-win situation) and that any hegemonic project must establish frontiers of 
antagonism if it is to achieve any coherence. Thus the idea of increasing regulation 
means to enter antagonism with free-marketeers, the politics of taxation means a 
confrontation with profit-maximisers, the pluralisation and democratisation of the 
spaces of representation means opposing the conventions of elitism and centralisation 
that currently exist, and so on. Second, this approach is not perceived as capable of 
delivering a rationalistic system that would progressively resolve all antagonisms. It 
too will necessarily be open to challenge and all those forces of the political that draw 
into question its principles of constitution.  
The charge of reformism does not fare any better as it relies on an essentialist 
reform/revolution distinction that is untenable. Revolutions are never simply degree-
zero displacements but are constituted as overdeterminations of reforms. Likewise any 
real reform (as opposed to a technicist adjustment) will always involve some kind of 
power shift in which alternatives are repressed. This allows us to articulate what 
might be called a revolutionary reformism (something which also resonates with the 
perspective of Hardt and Negri, 2001). Thus the reforming of democratic practices in 
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respect of women’s participation, or Black participation in South Africa, has led to 
profound changes in social power relations that unquestionably possesses a 
revolutionary dimension. It is precisely in this sense that a radical left approach can be 
developed. 
 
34. A crucial question that could be posed here is what is the agency of radical 
transformation, and more widely, what do we mean by the left? As regards the first 
part, the point is that it is impossible to determine political agency independently, or 
in advance, of historico-hegemonic practices. It is not as if there is an agency already 
formed, in an objectivist sense, which subsequently engages in hegemonic activity. As 
Laclau and Mouffe point out, the agency/hegemony distinction is a false one and that, 
radicalising the Gramscian argument, we should rather see hegemony itself as the 
very terrain for constituting agency and identity (2001: 85). So the question as to who 
or what is the agent of hegemony is non sequitur because agency/identity is fully 
imbricated in hegemonic-articulatory practices and is not external to them. 
A more pertinent question concerns how a left identity can be formed? Here I 
would again draw on Hardt and Negri who advance the compelling idea of developing 
a militancy without a fixed or pre-given notion of who or what the Militant is (2001: 
411-413). Beyond the class, the party, the vanguard and so on, militancy has no 
ultimate origin or paradigmatic form. In this way it becomes possible to develop a left 
militancy as a logic of articulation (although Hardt and Negri fail to do this and fall 
back on a metaphysical notion of ‘multitude’) between any number groups/identities 
within a certain political imagination: i.e. a logic based upon the central principles of 
maximising equality and freedoms for all. Militancy is no longer a question of 
Identity but rather identification with radical democratic principles. Again what is 
envisaged is not a simple aggregation of groups who naturalistically coincide. Rather 
what is endorsed is the Laclau-Mouffe argument that, through the power processes of 
identification and articulation, the very identities of the participant groups will 
themselves be modified. For example, the democratic articulation of feminist and anti-
racist groups will depend on their ability to inflect each others’ interests and to 
advance equivalentially those interests as their own: i.e. the demands for racial 
equality are linked simultaneously with the demands for gender equality (and vice 
versa). And this recursivity becomes what Gramsci would have called the organic 
cement for all groups. Thus the possibility arises for developing a far wider 
construction of left militancy through an equivalential (and mutually modifying) 
articulation of the various disaffected and antagonised groups around the constitutive 
principles of a progressive democratic imagination. Such a conception of militancy 
has the distinct advantage of connecting with a richness of political identities that 
already exists across the globe and of capitalising on new initiatives and creative ideas 
that can be accessed increasingly through internet and cyber-space technology. It is a 
view of militancy that resonates with Marx’s apocryphal comment that ‘insurrection is 
an art’ (cited in Trotsky, 1977). 
 
35. This draws upon the Lacanian notion of an ‘ethics of the Real’ (see esp. Žižek,   
      1990). 
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